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Competition policy is one of only four policies that fall 
within the exclusive competence of the European Union. 
It has the important role of preventing distortions in the 
EU’s internal market, prohibiting corporate practices as 
well as public measures which exclude or discriminate 
against competitors and harm consumers. Public 
authorities may not grant subsidies to confer a 
competitive advantage to firms, industries or regions. 
 
Although public subsidies, or ’state aid’ as they are called 
in the EU, are considered to be in principle ‘incompatible 
with the internal market’, their prohibition is not absolute. 
Occasionally, public authorities may be justified to 
intervene in the market to support investments in, say, 
research and knowledge production, environmental 
protection, training or employment of disadvantaged 
workers. Because it is not always obvious when state 
intervention may be necessary to remedy market failure, 
EU rules require Member States to notify to the European 
Commission any aid they intend to grant and request the 
Commission’s prior authorisation. 
 
The Commission is the sole authority in the EU with powers 
to determine the compatibility of state aid with the 
internal market. These extraordinary powers are conferred 
to the Commission directly by the Treaty and enable it to 
prohibit Member States from granting aid without having 
to initiate the normal infringement procedure. 
Competition policy is the only policy area where the 
Commission enjoys such powers. Over the years, the 
Commission has adopted numerous regulations and 
guidelines that define the various types of state aid that it 
considers to be compatible with the internal market. Since 
2005, the Commission has embarked on a process of 
reforming its state aid rules. This process culminated in July 
2014 in the adoption of several new regulations and 
guidelines. A full list of all the documents that came into 
force in July 2014 can be found on the Commission website 
(see Further Reading). 
 
The new rules were adopted within the framework of the 
so-called State Aid Modernisation (SAM) launched in May 
2012. The main purpose of the SAM was to streamline the 
various state aid rules, focus Commission action on the 
most distortionary types of aid and relieve as much as 
possible Member States from the administrative burden of 
notifying every state aid measure, regardless of its size and 
impact on the internal market. 
 
State aid rules are indispensable for the proper functioning 
of the internal market. Member States grant more than 
EUR 140 billion of aid to their industries (including 
railways). This amount, which is roughly equal to the total 
Executive Summary 
> The State Aid Modernisation that was completed 
in July 2014 has established the rules that apply 
to public subsidies in 2014-2020. 
> The new rules are based on ‘common 
compatibility principles’, which require that aid 
addresses market failure, is necessary and 
proportional, and does not cause excessive 
distortion of competition. 
> The institutional centrepiece of the 
Modernisation is the new General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER) that enables 
Member States to grant state aid without prior 
notification to the European Commission. 
> Member States can thus avoid the administrative 
cost of notification, while the Commission can 
direct its efforts to the most serious cases. 
> However, the increased use of the GBER has also 
made state aid measures less visible. 
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budget of the EU, has the potential to cause serious 
disruption to the functioning of the internal market. 
Therefore, two years after the new framework of rules was 
adopted is an opportune time to take stock of what has 
been achieved so far. 
 
Policy reform can be evaluated from two broad 
perspectives. It can be evaluated on the basis of general 
principles that apply to all policies such as economic 
efficiency, equity, etc. Or, it can be evaluated against the 
objectives that the policy itself seeks to achieve. The 
analysis in this paper follows the latter perspective. The 
achievements of the SAM are assessed against the goals it 
set for itself. 
 
Much has been written from an ex ante point of view about 
the aims of the SAM and how it was introduced and 
promoted by the Commission. However, so far, there has 
been no attempt to identify and assess its results from an 
ex post point of view. 
 
Objectives of the State Aid Modernisation 
 
The State Aid Modernisation Communication (COM (2012) 
209 final) set the following objectives: 
“(i) to foster sustainable, smart and inclusive growth in 
a competitive internal market; 
(ii) to focus Commission ex ante scrutiny on cases with 
the biggest impact on internal market whilst 
strengthening the Member States cooperation in State 
aid enforcement; 
(iii) to streamline the rules and provide for faster 
decisions.” 
 
The objective of fostering growth in a competitive market 
was to be achieved through state aid control that would 
“facilitate the treatment of aid which is well-designed, 
targeted at identified market failures and objectives of 
common interest, and least distortive (good aid)”. In 
addition, state aid control would “help Member States to 
strengthen budgetary discipline and improve the quality of 
public finances – resulting in a better use of taxpayers' 
money”, contribute to “more effectiveness in public 
spending (use of state aid only where it represents a “real 
added–value” and leads to “cost-effective and growth 
enhancing aid”). 
 
To achieve the objective of fostering growth, the 
Commission proposed to: 
• define “common principles applicable to the 
assessment of compatibility”; 
• undertake “revision and streamlining of state aid 
guidelines, to make them consistent with those 
common principles”;  
• pursue a “more systematic assessment of the 
potential negative effects of State aid - notably in 
terms of distortions of allocative and dynamic 
efficiency, subsidy races and market power”. 
 
In relation to the objective of focusing Commission ex ante 
scrutiny on cases with the biggest impact on the internal 
market, the Commission proposed to: “review the de 
minimis Regulation” and to “extend the General Block 
Exemption Regulation”. In relation to the objective of 
streamlined rules and faster decisions, the proposed 
actions were: “better explanation of the notion of State 
aid” and revision of the “Procedural Regulation with 
regards to complaint-handling and market information 
tools”. 
 
The SAM was launched in 2012 and the new framework of 
rules and procedures was largely completed by July 2014. 
This missing piece was the paper on the Notion of State Aid. 
It was eventually published on 19 May 2016. 
 
Assessment of the initial results of the SAM 
 
A search of the data base of the Commission’s Directorate-
General for Competition (DG COMP) indicates that 
between 1 July 2014 and 22 May 2016, DG COMP dealt 
with 700 state aid cases. Most of these cases were assessed 
on the basis of the guidelines that expired on 30 June 2014. 
 
Further refinement of the search criteria reveals one R&D 
case, one risk finance case, six cases of regional aid, other 
than regional aid maps, of which four concerned outermost 
regions, and 49 cases of environmental and green energy 
aid, of which 20 concerned windfarm projects in Germany. 
It appears then that the Commission has dealt in depth 
with about 25-30 cases of these types of aid in the first two 
years of the SAM. 
 
Aid for environmental protection and green energy, 
regional development, research and risk finance accounts 
for close to 85-90% of all horizontal aid that is granted in 
the EU. In other words, in the period from July 2014 to May 
2016, the visibility of how the most important state aid 
guidelines are implemented is extremely low. This may be 
caused by two different factors: first, the search engine 
does not appear to pick up all the relevant cases; second, 
the low visibility may be the result of the spectacular 
success of the Commission to induce Member States to use 
the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
(Regulation 651/2014). The purpose of the GBER is 
precisely to relieve Member States from the obligation to 
notify new state aid measures. Commission officials have 
mentioned in conferences that about 87% of all state aid 
measures implemented by Member States have been 
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adopted in compliance with the GBER. However, the other 
side of the coin of the success of the GBER may be that little 
is now publicly known about the quality of the measures 
implemented by Member States and the extent of their 
conformity with the letter as well as the spirit of the GBER. 
The Commission certainly has a much better view of what 
Member States do. But the important point is that this 
knowledge is not public. To the extent that such knowledge 
contributes to the design and uniform application of state 
aid measures across the EU, the relative decrease in the 
public availability of such knowledge can be assumed to 
have a non-negligible negative effect on cross-border 
competition and investment. 
 
What is not yet known 
 
Without a large empirical study, it is not possible to know 
whether the SAM has reached its objectives of fostering 
“sustainable and smart growth” in the internal market. 
Similarly, the Commission has examined many state aid 
measures since July 2014, but there is no evidence that 
those were the ones with “the biggest impact on the 
internal market”. So far there is no plan to test the impact 
of SAM as a whole on the European economy. 
 
However, an innovation that was introduced in 2014 was 
the requirement for ex post evaluation of the effectiveness 
of schemes with budgets exceeding EUR 150 million per 
year. It is understood that the Commission has so far 
approved about 30 ex post evaluation plans. Their results 
will not be known until 2018-2019. It is likely that the 
findings of these evaluations will feed into the new rules 
that will be adopted for the period 2021-2027. 
 
What is well known 
 
The scope of the GBER has been expanded significantly. As 
mentioned above, close to 90% of all state aid measures 
implemented by Member States are now based on GBER 
provisions. This is a major success for the SAM, as increased 
use of the GBER relieves the Commission from having to 
deal with routine or insignificant cases. It also relieves 
Member States from the administrative cost of 
notification. 
 
All the rules (regulations and guidelines) now assess the 
compatibility of state aid according to the same principles 
– the so-called common assessment principles. This 
innovation has three major advantages: first, it makes the 
enforcement of the rules more uniform across all types of 
aid; second, it enables Member States to gain more 
experience on how state aid is assessed by learning from 
practice across the spectrum of the various types of aid; 
third, the common assessment principles have solid 
theoretical foundations and make the previous procedure, 
which was often formalistic, more rigorous. 
 
Cooperation between the Commission and Member States 
in state aid enforcement has expanded through the 
establishment of the SAM working group and through 
bilateral meetings. 
 
What is gradually becoming known 
 
Ex post monitoring of implemented state aid measures by 
the Commission is increasingly  covering more measures. 
Currently, the size of the sample of monitored measures 
appears to be about 7%. So far, however, most monitored 
measures are still those that were adopted in the previous 
period (2007-13). The measures that fall under the post- 
2014 rules will be monitored as of 2017. The results of the 
ex post monitoring are not yet public, nor is it clear how 
and whether this monitoring has contributed to reducing 
the rate of ‘irregularities’ and other design mistakes by 
Member States. 
 
With respect to the goal of faster decisions, formally the 
Commission must deal with a notified measure within two 
months. However, cursory analysis of the actual time 
length between the date of notification and the date of 
final decision suggests that the Commission needs about 
seven to eight months to approve measures. This analysis 
does not take into account the time length of pre-
notification contacts.  
 
It seems that the time needed for approval of notified 
measures has actually increased by 40% to 60% in relation 
to the period 2007-2013 when the average period of 
approval was thought to be about five months. The 
apparent increase in the time needed by the Commission 
to authorise aid may be caused by two factors: first, 
Member States notify now more complex measures, as 
they can use the GBER for many more categories of 
otherwise routine or simpler measures; second, since July 
2014, notification involves detailed assessment of state aid 
on the basis of the ’common compatibility principles’. 
Detailed assessment is a cumbersome process, requiring 
analysis of a large amount of information on market 
conditions, the need and proportionality of aid and the 
likely impact of aid on competitors. 
 
Unexpected consequences of the increased use of 
General Block Exemption 
 
The increased use of the GBER is not costless. There are at 
least three consequences that can be identified.  
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First, it is not clear how Member States understand and 
implement the GBER. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
officials who meet at EU level (e.g. SAM working group) 
naturally tend to have convergent views, that the 
Commission publishes explanatory answers on questions 
concerning the GBER (e.g. GBER FAQ) and that the purpose 
of the ex post monitoring is precisely to check that Member 
States apply the GBER properly. However, the monitoring 
covers only a small minority of state aid measures. 
Moreover, it is not completely random. The Commission 
naturally chooses to audit large or novel measures. But it 
cannot be inferred that other measures are designed and 
implemented correctly. The cumulative impact of small 
errors may be significant. The Commission may retort, with 
some justification, that the GBER has been deliberately 
drafted to be easily understood and applied. This is 
certainly true. However, the number of definitions has 
grown exponentially from 20 in the previous GBER 
(Regulation 800/2008) to 140 in the current GBER. This 
implies that the possibility for mistakes due to 
misinterpretation has also increased. In this respect, the 
previous system, whereby most measures were checked by 
the Commission, had the advantage of detecting any 
mistakes of interpretation before measures were 
implemented and of allowing Member States the flexibility 
to vary their particular measures, knowing that their 
variation was in conformity with the rules. 
 
Second, where Member States have doubts, they can ask 
the Commission for clarification. The contacts between a 
Member State and the Commission remain private and 
bilateral, as the Commission’s answers are not necessarily 
spread to other Member States. Admittedly, some of these 
answers find their way into the frequently asked questions 
on the GBER. However, not all questions are included in the 
FAQ document which is posted on DG COMP’s website. 
Also, the FAQ document is not so frequently updated. 
More importantly, the FAQ document provides generic 
answers to general questions. The public understanding of 
state aid rules and of the range of possible public measures 
to which they can apply depends even more on the 
Commission’s assessment of specific cases and 
identification of faulty programme designs and ineligible 
objectives, procedures or costs. The FAQ document does 
not identify errors or mistakes.  
 
Finally, increased use of the GBER has reduced legal 
certainty in several ways: first, Member States are less sure 
about the legality of a significantly larger number of their 
state aid measures; second, there is the legal conundrum 
of whether aid recipients can claim legitimate expectations 
if they receive aid on the basis of the GBER. Although EU 
courts have repeatedly stated that legitimate expectations 
can be entertained only on the basis of assurances given by 
EU institutions, it is not clear what their position would be 
in relation to GBER-related aid since, by definition, such aid 
is not supposed to be notified to the Commission; third, 
GBER-related aid should in principle be actionable before 
national courts. In this regard, national courts would have 
to determine whether the aid is legally granted, which 
implies that they would have to interpret the provisions of 
the GBER. This may inadvertently lead to uneven 
application of the GBER across the EU; lastly, Member 
States have not stopped notifying measures to the 
Commission. Because the Commission does not wish to 
proceed to full-blown assessments, it sends ‘comfort 
letters’ to Member States, assuring them of the 
compatibility of the aid on the basis of the information 
submitted to it. The legal value of such comfort letters has 
been extensively debated in the literature. They may 
provide some assurance to Member States but since they 
are a symptom of the increased reliance on the GBER, they 
too have contributed to lowering the common 
understanding of the application of state aid rules. 
 
Other SAM objectives 
 
The 2012 SAM Communication also referred to 
strengthening “budgetary discipline”, improving the 
“quality of public finances”, “better use of taxpayers' 
money”, “more effectiveness in public spending”, use of 
state aid with “real added-value” and “cost-effective” aid. 
Although these terms are not further explained or 
elaborated in the Communication, they suggest that the 
new rules would lead to some kind of cost-benefit analysis 
of state aid. The common principles of compatibility, like 
their predecessor – the “balancing test” which was 
introduced by the 2005 State Aid Action Plan – weigh the 
positive effects of state aid against the negative effects in 
terms of distortion of competition. But it is important to 
understand that this balancing is not a proper cost-benefit 
assessment whereby the internal benefits (gains of the aid 
recipient) and the external benefits (other gains for 
society) of state aid are quantified and compared to the 
costs of state aid, including its own opportunity cost 
(forgone net gain in the best alternative use). This is how 
the cost-effectiveness of aid could be ensured. 
 
For instance, under current rules, state aid is allowed when 
it is shown that a project experiences a ‘funding gap’, i.e. 
the initial investment cost exceeds the expected stream of 
net revenue from the project. The presence of a funding 
gap demonstrates the need for aid. The size of the funding 
gap shows how much aid is needed (proportionality of aid). 
If the project is, for example, a port in a poor region, it can 
contribute to increased trade in that region, and if there is 
no other port close by its impact on competition would be 
minimal and the Commission would approve the aid. The 
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funding gap method has placed the assessment of state aid 
on a technically more rigorous basis. However, the 
presence of a funding gap does not mean that the 
approved aid is money well spent. It shows that a project 
cannot be completed without aid, but it does not prove 
that the aid benefits the region or the economy at large. 
 
Summary of SAM objectives and outcomes 
SAM objectives Assessment of 
outcomes 
Contribution to growth Unknown 
Focus on measures with biggest impact 
on internal market 
Unknown 
Ex post evaluation of state aid Not yet known 
Greater use of GBER Yes 
Closer cooperation between 
Commission and Member States 
Yes 
Better understanding of the concept of 
state aid 
Yes 
Value for money Only indirectly 
Faster decisions No 
 
SAM unintended consequences Assessment 
Better understanding of application of 
state aid rules 
Less 
Legal certainty Less 
 
Since 2014, the Commission has prohibited quite a few 
measures for granting or proposing to grant aid that was 
unnecessary, excessive and, in two cases, for not 
contributing to an objective of common interest (Gdynia 
airport, Poland; Zweibrücken airport, Germany). Certainly, 
when aid is unnecessary, excessive or not able to generate 
benefits for society, it is money not well spent or it does 
not add value. However, it does not follow that, as the 
example above demonstrates, all approved aid adds value. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In at least two respects, the SAM has had a spectacular 
success. Through much greater use of the GBER, Member 
States can avoid the administrative cost of notification and, 
correspondingly, the Commission can direct its efforts to 
the most serious cases instead of having to process 
insignificant cases. 
 
At the same time, the reduction in administrative costs and 
avoidance of unnecessary notification and control by the 
Commission may have had an unexpected negative impact. 
It has reduced the visibility of state aid measures and the 
public understanding of how they are implemented. It is 
not possible to estimate the magnitude of this possible 
negative effect. However, the SAM may still succeed in 
shedding more light on the actual effectiveness of state 
aid, as Member States have been asked for the first time to 
carry out ex post evaluations of their state aid schemes 
with budgets exceeding EUR 150 million. The first results of 
these evaluations are expected in 2018-19. 
 
Lastly, the SAM has also advocated that state aid must add 
value. The Commission will need to clarify whether it 
intends to proceed to a cost-benefit analysis proper or 
whether it considers that such an analysis falls outside its 
mandate of ensuring the compatibility of state aid with the 
internal market. It could certainly be assumed that the ex 
post evaluation of the effectiveness of state aid may lead 
to a more thorough assessment of the overall impact of 
state aid on the European economy. 
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